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Fox: Those Unpublished Opinions: An Appropriate Expedience or an Abdic

THOSE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS:
AN APPROPRIATE EXPEDIENCE OR AN
ABDICATION OF RESPONSIBILITY?
Lawrence J. Fox*
I was originally going to discuss unciteable opinions. But then I
thought, this is such a trivial topic. With so many more important things
happening in America, I decided to switch topics and discuss the crises
in healthcare and education. I want you to consider two hypotheticals.
DOCTOR TO PATIENT: "I'm in a hurry. Lots of patients to see. Sorry I

can't tell you more. But you've had a standard issue myocardial
infarction. If you go to the WebMD site everything you need to know
is found under 'Typical Heart Attack."'
"But Doctor Kozinski..."
"No buts about it. Do you want me to complete my rounds or not?"
"Actually..."
TEACHER TO STUDENT:

"I have read your paper. It deserves a C."

"Oh, I worked so hard, Professor Kozinski."
"Well, maybe you'll do better next time."
"How can I do better?"
"I wish I had the time to tell you. But with twenty essays to mark, I
just don't have the time. Why don't you read Emily's essay? She got
an A+."

*

Thomas J. O'Boyle Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School;

Partner, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP; B.A. 1965, L.L.B. 1968 University of Pennsylvania.
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"Thanks, Professor Kozinski."

Well, on second thought, maybe those topics are too daunting for
me. I think unciteable decisions may be just the kind of topic I can get
my small mind around.
Actually, when Monroe Freedman asked me to tackle this issue, my
immediate response was that I was glad to do so. My interest then was
entirely practical. I'm a practicing lawyer. I have an obligation to
represent my clients to the best of my ability. Since I am a trial lawyer I
spend the better part of my life-not researching, heaven forefend-but
reviewing the drafts of my associates, who I expect to undertake a
comprehensive review of applicable case law and related authorities so
that I can turn their careful research memoranda into passionate
arguments dotted with citations explaining why the court should find for
our client.
I only have one standard for that work. Whether for paying clients
or pro bono, whether a minor discovery motion or a petition for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, I strive for excellence.
And that search for excellence often leads me to unpublished decisions
of a court,' decisions that my associates and I view as extremely helpful
to our client's position.
Sometimes the unpublished decision appears to be the only
authority going our way. Sometimes it provides affirmation of a
1. For typical standards for publishing, see, for example, 4TH CIR. R. 36(a).
Opinions delivered by the Court will be published only if the opinion satisfies one or
more of the standards for publication:
i. It establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies, or explains a rule of law within
this Circuit; or
ii. It involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or
iii. It criticizes existing law; or
iv. It contains a historical review of a legal rule that is not duplicative; or
v. It resolves a conflict between panels of this Court, or creates a conflict
with a decision in another circuit.
Id.
Though beyond the scope of this paper these standards present serious problems. While the
issues they raise are numerous, permit me to address two. First, the court decides this issue at the
wrong time and without the benefit of outside input. I know judges are well-informed, and they are
undoubtedly well-informed about the public interest, but is the judiciary the only repository of what
is in the public interest? Moreover, can you always tell today what will be in the public interest in
the future? Second, whole categories of opinions that are important are systematically excluded by
this standard. For example, it is one thing to be able to cite to a case that announces a new rule, but
opinions that follow that new rule can be virtually as important to the development of the law as the
original opinion. Similarly, while a case that criticizes a precedent has great interest, so does one that
endorses an existing precedent that may, sometime later, be under attack.
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principle enumerated in a published opinion that we wish to cite to show
our leading precedent is not an outlier. Sometimes it demonstrates that a
published precedent involving different facts on vhich we wish to
construct our argument should be applied to the facts of our case.
However it arises, if the unpublished opinion is from a different
court from the one in which we appear, we can cite the case without fear
or trepidation.2 But if the unpublished opinion was issued by the very
court we wish to persuade, then the mere mention of the case-not its
citation as precedent but its citation for any reason-will not only violate
a rule of the court3-never a very good idea-but, at least in the view of
Judge Kozinski, will represent "a specific kind of fraud on the deciding
court. ' A Wow! One point I do know. It is one thing to get judges angry
with you. It is quite another to engage in fraud.
But it is hard to overstate the frustration that the inability to cite
these cases can cause. Here I am providing the court with all the reasons
why my client should prevail, able to bring anything to the attention of
the court that I think might be persuasive. I can use published opinions,
unpublished opinions from other courts, Brandeis briefs, lectures at
Hofstra, articles in Vanity Fair or the Hofstra Law Review, websites,

2. Judge Kozinski, about whom more later, recognizes this irony. See Hearing on
Unpublished Judicial Opinions Before the House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property, 107th Cong. (statement of Judge Alex Kozinski), available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/kozinski062702.htm (June 27, 2002) [hereinafter Kozinski
Testimony].
3. See, e.g., 9TH CIR. R. 36-3. This Ninth Circuit rule, titled "Citation of Unpublished
Dispositions or Orders," provides:
(a) Not Precedent: Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not binding
precedent, except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case, res judicata, or
collateral estoppel.
(b) Citation:Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court may not be cited to or by
the courts of this circuit except in the following circumstances.
(i) They may be cited to this Court or to or by any other court in this circuit when
relevant under the doctrine of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
(ii) They may be cited to this Court or by any other courts in this circuit for factual
purposes, such as to show double jeopardy, sanctionable conduct, notice,
entitlement to attorneys' fees, or the existence of a related case.
(iii) They may be cited to this Court in a request to publish a disposition or order
made pursuant to Circuit Rule 36-4, or in a petition for panel rehearing or
rehearing en banc, in order to demonstrate the existence of a conflict among
opinions, dispositions, or orders.
Id.
4. Kozinski Testimony, supra note 2.
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whatever. Judge Kozinski himself thought it was worthwhile to cite to an
article by Michael Hunter, a condemned man on death row. 5
But the one thing I cannot cite is an unpublished opinion written by
real judges who sat on the very court before whom I appear in a case that
involved real litigants in a real dispute that was actually decided using
the English language as a way of informing the litigants how the court
reached its decision. That opinion, if cited, could land me in jail, in
contempt of court.6
That's all I knew when Monroe Freedman called me. And since any
interference with my ability to be as zealous and effective an advocate as
I can be-particularly an impediment as absurd on its face as this oneis something I rail against, I therefore gladly embraced the assignment.
Little did I realize that I was embarking on a journey that would
take me into questions of procedural due process and equal protection,7
both the free speech and free petition clauses of the First Amendment,
and both Article III and the philosophical foundations behind the
development of precedent in the common law. 9 Scholars ° and frustrated
lawyers" l alike have spent an enormous amount of energy conjuring
theories why the concept of unpublished opinions is fundamentally
flawed. These theories are fascinating and undoubtedly reflect serious
challenges to the practice of making decisions of some courts
unpublished and unciteable.
That, however, is not my emphasis in this article. Rather, I want to
focus on the merits of the justifications that have been offered to support
unpublished opinions. This is not simply because they are of dubious
5. See Eugene Volokh, Capital Complications, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Feb. 24, 2003 at
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-volokh022403.asp.
6.

See 9TH CIR. R. 36-3, 46-2(a).

7. See, e.g., Mark D. Hinderks & Steve A. Leben, Restoring the Common in the Law: A
Proposalfor the Elimination of Rules Prohibitingthe Citation of UnpublishedDecisions in Kansas

and the Tenth Circuit, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 155, 217 (1992).
8. See David Greenwald & Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., The CensorialJudiciary, 35 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1133, 1161-67 (2002).
9. See Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, I J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
219, 226 (1999). Judge Arnold's view that the use of unciteable precedent threatened the Article III
role ofjudges found expression in his opinion in Anastasoffv. UnitedStates. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.
2000), vacated en banc 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). For a good discussion of the tortured history
of this case see Greenwald & Schwarz, supranote 8, at 1159-61.
10. The most comprehensive work in this area is by Professors William L. Reynolds and
William M. Richman. See generally Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential PrecedentLimited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L.

REv. 1167 (1978).
11. See generally Greenwald & Schwarz, supranote 8.
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validity, but also because they raise serious questions about whether
judges are acting ethically when they write opinions that they then
designate as unciteable.
Before I get to the main event, permit me to cast aside some
arguments that have been offered to justify this practice, but that clearly
have no validity.
First, we have been told that unpublished opinions should not be
citeable because they are not generally available or, alternatively, they
are only available to the well-heeled, thus creating a mismatch of
resources, something the courts can correct by making these decisions
unciteable. 12 Whatever merit this argument had years ago, it reflects a
world that no longer exists. The competition among databases and
publishers means that almost everything judges do is broadcast to the
world almost as soon as it happens. West even publishes volumes of
unpublished opinions. 13 So do local legal newspapers.1 4 And Lexis and
Westlaw have included in their electronic brains virtually every act by
every judge, except perhaps snoring during dull oral arguments. 15
Moreover, the courts often make unciteable opinions available on their
websites. 16
12. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 10, at 1187 n.111 ("This argument is probably the
most frequently mentioned aspect of the entire limited publication, no-citation debate."). See, e.g.,
United States v. Joly, 493 F.2d 672, 676 (2d Cir. 1974); Jones v. Superintendent, 465 F.2d 1091,
1094 (4th Cir. 1972).
13. The volumes are called the Federal Appendix and they are steadily marching across
library shelves in those few places where people still maintain books. See ZIMMERMAN'S RESEARCH
GUIDE, Unreported Decisions, at http://www.lexisone.com/zimmermanguide/U/Unreported
Decisions.html (last visited March 21, 2004).
14. See id. In Philadelphia, The Legal Intelligencer regularly makes available unpublished
opinions.
15. See RONALD JAY COHEN, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON RECOMMENDATION
FOR PUBLICATION AND RELIANCE UPON UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF

APPEALS, available at http://abanet.org/leadership/2001/115.pdf. (March 31, 2001) (draft). The
Eleventh Circuit does not release its unpublished opinions to Westlaw.
16. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits make unpublished opinions
available on their websites. See UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT,
OPINIONS, available at http://www.cal.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/ChkUser2.pl?GotoURL=/opinions/
main.php (last visited March 21, 2004) (making available the latest unpublished opinions of the
First Circuit); UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, TODAY'S OPINIONS,
available at http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/new/today2.pl (last visited March 21, 2004)
(making available the latest unpublished opinions of the Eighth Circuit). See, e.g., SEC v,
Armstrong, No 03-6080(L), 2004 WL 362318 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:81/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcUIVNXDAzLTYwODBfc28ucGRm/0
3-6080_so.pdf#xml=http://lO.213.23.111:81/isysquery/irlI668/1/hilite (last visited March 21,
2004); Dunkin' Donuts Inc. v. Liu, No. 02-2972, 2003 US App. LEXIS 22812 (3d Cir. Nov. 6,
2003), available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/022972u.pdf (last visited March 21,
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Nor is there a difference in access to this information between rich
and poor. In my humble opinion, every lawyer in America, regardless of
practice setting, cannot meet the standard of care to his or her clients
without checking the electronic wizardry of Lexis or Westlaw (and
perhaps both). There is no legal service office, public defender, or solo
practitioner in Hazleton, Pennsylvania who does not have access to and
is not required to consult these databases daily in order to represent their
clients in a manner consistent with the rules of professional conduct
governing competence and diligence.17
Second, even with the huge increase in the number of reported and
unreported decisions, 18 the burden of researching this corpus bears no
relationship to the pain lawyers used to endure to drag out volumes of
the old Decennial Digests, wandering aimlessly using the very rough
tool of West Digest key numbers, for that nugget of a case buried in
some dusty supplement, the consulting of which was both a tedious and
essential research process when I was first called to the bar.
An oft-repeated Drinker Biddle & Reath story will illustrate the
point. When Icame to the firm in 1972, my colleague Amy Davis had
become a firm heroine because across the last number of days she had
leafed through dozens of volumes of the Federal Supplement searching
for any class action decisions by Judge Lord; miraculously, she had
found one, a decision the Drinker partner was convinced would win the
day. Using one of the electronic databases, that same process would take
less than five seconds today.
So when Judge Kozinski tells us that lawyers and judges would
have to consult an additional 3800 yearly Ninth Circuit decisions in
researching a question,' 9 I am not impressed by that "burden." First of
all, of course, I won't do it; my associates will. More importantly, they
will be able to do so with virtually the same speed with which they
search a smaller number of cases, thanks to the gift of computers.
Almost instantly 99.9% of these new cases will be discarded as
irrelevant, leaving us with perhaps three or four more cases to read
2004); Chandler v. Lee, No. 03-6, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 4278 (4th Cir. March 5, 2004), available
at http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/036.U.pdf (last visited March 21, 2004).
17.

See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002) (requiring, for competent

representation of a client, "legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation."); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2002) (requiring a
lawyer to "act with reasonable diligence and promptness" in his or her representation of the client).
18. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 8, at 1145-47.
19. See Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don't Cite This!: Why We Don't Allow
Citation to UnpublishedDispositions,CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 43, 44.
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which will be very short decisions if they are written as unpublished
opinions.
Moreover, making these 3800 opinions unciteable does not really
relieve lawyers from reviewing them. In connection with advising
clients, it would be terribly difficult to defend a failure to consult with a
client on the learning of a particularly relevant case because the opinion
was unciteable. Unciteable opinions also have to be reviewed to
determine if they can squeeze through one of the narrow exceptions that
permit citation. 2 0 Last, lawyers everywhere but in the Ninth Circuit are
free to cite these Ninth Circuit cases 21 and, therefore, presumably have to
review the 3800 anyway.
Third, citing these cases is not going to lead to some kind of
wholesale change in the way our presentations look to the courts.
Though judges often tell us otherwise, we are not stupid. We know the
judges don't like citation to unpublished opinions. So any citation to an
unpublished opinion will be made reluctantly. But when we find that
little gem that seems so important that we are prepared to throw caution
to the wind in the hope that we can use the decision in that case to make
a point we believe we have no other way of making, surely it makes no
sense that we not bring it to the attention of the court, when we know
that judges can be persuaded by matters far further afield than thateven articles by prisoners on death row.22
But none of my arguments responds to the real reason the courts
wish to promote and expand the use of unciteable opinions. And that is
the reason that I must address head-on. No, the use of unciteable
opinions has nothing to do with the unequal access to information or the
burden of creating too many precedents or the effect it will have on the
briefs we file. It has to do solely with the proposition that the courts
believe that if they make certain decisions unciteable then they are free
to treat those opinions with second-class status.
I take as my text Judge Kozinski himself. And I note that these
comments were made by Judge Kozinski, not in an unpublished opinion,
but in carefully crafted testimony he delivered to a Congressional
Subcommittee on the Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property on
June 27, 200223 and repeated in an article he published with Judge
20.

See, e.g., 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(b). Citation is permitted to show preclusion,

factual

circumstances of a previous related case, or in a petition for a rehearing. Id.
21. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
22.
23.

See generally Volokh, supra note 5.
See Kozinski Testimony, supranote 2.
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Reinhardt in the California Lawyer;24 therefore, these comments are
citeable, even quotable. He argues, heaven forefend, that if these
decisions were citeable, the judges who write them might have "to pay
much closer attention to their precise wording,, 25 the judges might have
to "agree on the precise reasoning, ' 26 the judges who dissent from the
result might have to make that fact known,27 and judges not on the panel
might "have to pay much closer attention" to the decisions written by
their colleagues.28 These are exact quotes, ladies and gentlemen.
Well, we cannot have that. What a terrible world we would have if
judges had to worry about all those things!
Au contraire. The world that is terrible is one in which we let
judges get away with these heretical notions. Judge Kozinski's
rationalizations, echoed by many others, are not only outrageous, but in
my view, violate the fundamental principles of the American Bar
Association Code of Judicial Conduct. First the outrage. Let's address
these rationalizations one by one.
Can we ever give judges a pass not to be precise in their language?
Of course not. From something as simple as an informal letter to
litigants to formal published opinions, judges must say what they mean
and mean what they say. Even if it is only the mere litigants before the
court, not the rest of the world, that will be guided and informed by the
text, judges have an absolute obligation to speak clearly. We mere
mortals-practicing lawyers who dutifully call judges "Your Honor" and
rise every time they walk in-play a critical role in the system of justice.
We are the intermediators between the courts and our clients. As a result,
just as we monitor every judge's raised eyebrow, laugh, sneer, and offhand remark for meaning, searching for clues to what judges think, we
carefully read every word judges write, and look for instructions and
guidance which we can share with our clients. "What does she, Her
Honor, really think" is our obligation to divine or discover, and we do so
by reading and rereading your words. If we are going to place such
weight on what you write-even in our garden variety cases-then
judges must write with precision or we will be misled. And please, dear
judges, remember that as garden variety as our cases may appear to you

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 19.
Kozinsky Testimony, supra note 2; Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 19, at 44.
Kozinsky Testimony, supra note 2; Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 19, at 44.
See Kozinsky Testimony, supra note 2; Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 19, at 44.
Kozinsky Testimony, supra note 2; Kozinski & Reinhardt, supranote 19, at 44.
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(and perhaps even to us lawyers), there has never been a litigant who
thought his or her case was garden variety in any respect.
Judge Kozinski's next justification-that judges might have to
agree on the reasoning if the opinions were citeable-is equally
troubling. 29 If in fact judges reach the same result, but for different
reasons, are not the litigants-if not the entire world-absolutely entitled
to know that fact? Embedded in that undisclosed difference is a real
opportunity for the party who loses the appeal to seek further review.
The failure to agree on the principle that supports the result-if it were
disclosed to the lawyer for the disappointed appellant or appellee-could
demonstrate how tenuous the result really is and, if disclosed on a
petition for en banc review or a petition for certiorari, might, just might,
capture the imagination of some conscientious judges. Indeed, as two
astute lawyers have observed, "If a case truly fails to 'establish[], alter[],
modify, or clarify a rule of law,' why then can three judges not agree on
the appropriate reasoning?, 30 By putting whitewash over the panel's
differences by issuing unciteable opinions that render such disputes
opaque, one litigant has been denied information to which it is clearly
entitled.
Worse still, Judge Kozinski says that if we made all decisions
citeable the judges who dissent from the result might have to make that
fact known.31 If it is a sin to hide differences in reasoning from a losing
party in litigation, then hiding a dissent has to be a mortal sin. First,
speaking just as a lawyer who, from time to time, has confronted
disappointed clients after my eloquence on appeal did not carry the day,
how much better I (and even my client) would have felt if the opinion
had included a dissent. The fact that I captured the imagination of one
judge lends a certain credibility to my earlier incorrect prediction of
victory. But enough of my ego. The fact that one judge dissented is a
fact that must be disclosed to the litigants, even if it means the opinion
has to be citeable. Whatever basis for further review a difference of
29. Here is what Judge Patricia M. Wald has described:
I have seen judges purposely compromise on an unpublished decision incorporating an
agreed-upon result in order to avoid a time-consuming public debate about what law
controls. I have even seen wily would-be. dissenters go along with a result they do not
like so long as it is not elevated to a precedent.
Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV.1371, 1374 (1995).
30. Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 8, at 1149 (quoting 9TH CIR. R. 36-2(a), the court rule
laying out the criteria for publication of a court opinion).
31. See supranote 27 and accompanying text.
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opinion on the reason for the result might provide, by definition a dissent
by one judge provides even more. Indeed, review en banc is rarely a
route that should be pursued unless there has been a split on the
appellate panel.
Finally, Judge Kozinski tells us how important it is that the Ninth
Circuit "maintain[s] a consistent, internally coherent and predictable
body of circuit law."32 This goal would be undermined, we are also told,
if judges on the Ninth Circuit had to review these unciteable opinions.
Am I allowed to be shocked? One would have thought just the opposite.
In order to have "a consistent, internally coherent and predictable body
of circuit law" 33 what is required are real decisions entirely consistent
with this body of law. Otherwise, why bother having precedent?
This "see no evil, hear no evil" aspect of the no-citation rule is
particularly troubling. It is as if the courts are scared that if they let
counsel cite to these unpublished decisions, the courts may be
confronted with arguments whose implications are embarrassing. If we
don't let you tell us that we have acted inconsistently, the courts seem to
be saying, then we can blissfully wallow in our ignorance, convinced
that we are "maintaining a consistent, internally coherent and predictable
body of circuit law" 34 because nobody has told us otherwise. The fact

that "we" haven't let the poor practicing lawyers tell us is irrelevant, I
suppose.
I know. I know. This is all done in defense of a badly overworked
judiciary that thinks it has found a way out of the morass. I am sure the
judges who have reached this conclusion have done so in good faith.
Besides, unlike many academics in this audience, I am still practicing
law, and therefore have no choice but to assert the judiciary's good faith
in this regard.
But this is an ethics conference. And the ethics issue cannot be
avoided. As clear as it is that the no-citation rules reflect bad public
policy, can we also make the argument that the judge's conduct runs
afoul of the applicable judicial canons of ethics? There are three
provisions of the ABA Canons that are certainly implicated by what has
been outlined above.

32. Kozinski Testimony, supra note 2.
33. Id.
34. Id.;
see also Hinderks & Leben, supra note 7, at 184-85 (discussing the various ways that
the no-citation rules offend the traditional policies behind the use of precedent).
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First, the Code tells judges that they shall perform their duties
"diligently." 35 When one thinks about the cognate for lawyers, Model
Rule 1.3,36 it would not be difficult to conclude that a lawyer who failed
to perform assiduously because he was too busy would have that excuse
fall on deaf ears. Even a lawyer in the public interest has an absolute
obligation to limit her case load so that she can be diligent on behalf of
all her clients. 37 The question then arises whether an overworked,
underpaid judiciary confronted with too great a caseload can solve the
problem by giving all of the litigants half a loaf. Or whether the proper
response, given the diligence obligation, doesn't mean that judges
should not facilitate underfunding of the judiciary by delivering second
class justice.
Second, judges are to be "faithful to the law., 38 We have no case
law that puts real meaning to this provision. But, if Judge Arnold is
right, judges have no greater calling than to decide cases fairly,
impartially, consistently, and with a full explanation to the parties of the
basis for the decision. Without each of these the system of justice either
is corrupt or will be perceived that way.
And on a more mundane level, can judges say they are being
faithful to the law when they take steps to avoid knowing what the court
on which the judge sits decided in a case that the lawyers
(wrongheadedly, of course) think is persuasive support for their client's
position?
Third, judges are admonished to maintain "professional
competence. 3 9 Again, we have little in the way of commentary or case
law to tell us what is required to fulfill this obligation. Am I free to argue
that based on the lawyer cognate, Model Rule 1.1,40 a judge who fails to

write opinions with sufficient clarity of language and adequate
consideration of the opinion's precedential value violates the obligation

35.
36.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1990).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2003).

37. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 347, at 141 (1981)
(discussing the ethical obligations of legal services lawyers to clients when those offices lose
funding); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 399, at 382 (1996)
(discussing the ethical obligations of public service lawyer during a reduction in staffing to refrain
from accepting additional assignments).
38. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(2) (1990).
39. Id.
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2003).
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of competence? Looking at the cases brought under Rule 1.1,41 one can
find violations reasonably similar to the lapses admitted by Judge
Kozinski in his justification for a body of unciteable opinions. Thus, one
would certainly hope so.
In conclusion, I was struck by Professor Charles Fried's reference,
in this symposium, to the importance of ritual to the role of the judge.42
Professor Fried's discussion called to mind a vignette not unlike the ones
with which I opened my remarks.
"I'm quite busy this Shabbas. So sorry. But
to speed things along I thought we would eliminate that parading of the
Torah scrolls around the synagogue."
RABBI TO CONGREGATION:

"But Rabbi Kozinski," shouted an alarmed Cantor Freedman, "that's
the most popular part of the service."
"That may be, but as I read the Talmudic scholars, it's hardly required,
Cantor."
So too with judges' opinions. It may not, in the end, be absolutely
required that all litigants receive opinions that are prepared with
precision, that disclose disputes among the panel regarding reasoning,
that reveal dissents, and that take into account all existing precedent. But
it is important-to the litigants, to society, to the judges themselves. As
a result I can only conclude that expedient unciteable justice is really no
justice at all. And that the practice of generating unciteable opinions
ought to end for public policy, ethical, and symbolic reasons.

41. See id.; see, e.g., Ky. Bar Ass'n v. Brown, 14 S.W.3d 916 (Ky. 2000) (holding under a
state version of Rule 1.1 that the attorney failed to provide competent representation where he did
not follow rules governing form and content for his brief).
42. See Charles Fried, A Meditation on the FirstPrinciples of JudicialEthics, 32 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 1227, 1236 (2004).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss4/9

12

